Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 2

Article 11

April 1984

Municipal Antitrust: An Overview
Donald Gene Kalfen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Donald G. Kalfen, Municipal Antitrust: An Overview , 60 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 349 (1984).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol60/iss2/11

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST: AN OVERVIEW
DONALD GENE KALFEN*

The Sherman Antitrust Act' is generally viewed as prohibiting cer-

tain types of anticompetitive conduct that is engaged in by private parties. Notwithstanding this view, trial courts must now grapple with the
problem of applying the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act to
alleged anticompetitive conduct of municipalities. This situation is
before the federal courts due to the Supreme Court's recent narrowing
of the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine was first articulated in Parker v.Brown ,2 where the Court held that the federal anti-

trust laws are inapplicable to the states when they are acting pursuant
to their sovereign capacity.3 However, the Supreme Court held in
Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder,4 that a municipality, even though acting pursuant to its lawful authority, does not
enjoy this blanket exemption afforded to the states.
Two recent lower court decisions have held, on the merits, that a
B.S., Accountancy, University of Illinois, 1979; Candidate for J.D., lIT/Chicago-Kent
College of Law, 1984.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal.
...Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony .. " Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
3. The courts frequently refer to the state action doctrine as an "immunity" or "exemption"
from the antitrust laws. Nonetheless, the Parker Court never used the terms "immunity" or "exemption" in its decision. Immunity connotes an affirmative defense, which the state action doctrine is not. Rather the doctrine provides that the Sherman Act is simply inapplicable to the
particular state action under inquiry. Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1279 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1975). For additional commentary on the Parker decision and the state action doctrine, see
generally Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435
(1981); Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1976); Spiegel, Local Governments and the Terror of Antitrust, 69 A.B.A.J. 163 (1983);
Note, Antitrust Law--Sherman Act-Home Rule Municipal Ordinances, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 709
(1983); Note, Municipalities and the Antitrust Laws: Home Rule Authority isInsufficient to Ensure
State Action Immunity, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1982); Note, Home Rule and The Sherman Act
After Boulder. Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 259 (1983).
4. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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city official 5 and a village 6 violated the antitrust laws. All other lower
court decisions have only considered in what circumstance municipal
action is protected under the state action doctrine. This note will examine the significant problems the courts will encounter when
presented with a municipal antitrust action. Part I of this note tracks
the development of the state action doctrine. Part II states the Boulder
holding and the significance it has on municipal antitrust cases. Part
III examines the analytical problems of applying section 1 of the Sherman Act to municipal defendants and suggests an approach which
would permit municipalities to defend their anticompetitive conduct.
Finally, Part IV considers the likelihood of treble damages 7 being assessed against a municipal defendant.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

The state action doctrine finds its roots in federalism notions first
expressed by the Court long before the Parker decision. 8 However, it
was not until Parker did the Court highlight the interaction between
federalism principles and the Sherman Act in a state regulatory context. Parker's progeny help to further define this interaction as well as
the contours of the state action doctrine.
A.

Parker v. Brown

In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court first articulated the state
action doctrine. In Parker, a California state statute9 authorized state
officials to establish marketing programs for agricultural commodities
produced in the state. The defendants were the California Director of
Agriculture and other public officials charged by the statute with the
responsibility for administering a program for the marketing of the
5. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'ggranteden
banc, 714 F.2d 25 (1983).
6. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, NAT'L L.J, Jan. 30, 1984, at 3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1984).
7. The Sherman Act as originally passed provided for treble damages, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
209 (1890). This section was repealed and substantially adopted in § 4 of the Clayton Act which
provides in full:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
8. For a discussion of the Court's view of state action prior to Parker, see Deak-Perera
Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 553 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Hawaii 1983).
9. California Agricultural Prorate Act, 1933 Cal. Stat. 754, amended by 1935 Cal. Stat. 471,
743; 1938 Cal. Stat. Extra Session 6; 1939 Cal. Stat. 363, 548, 894; 1941 Cal. Stat. 603, 1150, 1186.
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1940 raisin crop. The express purpose of the program was to restrict
competition among growers and maintain prices in the distribution of
raisins to packers.' 0 The plaintiff, a producer and packer of raisins,
alleged that this program prevented him from freely marketing his crop
in interstate commerce.
The Court noted that a comparable program organized by private
parties would violate the antitrust laws."t Nevertheless, the Court held
that the defendants had not violated the Sherman Act because the Act
was not intended to restrain a state, its officers, or agents from activities
directed by their legislature.' 2 The Court found nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggested that the Act
could proscribe anticompetitive state action.' 3 Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that in a "dual system of government" such as ours, that
recognizes the sovereignty of states, an "unexpressed purpose to nullify
a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed
4
to Congress."'
Although the Parker decision recognized the inapplicability of the
Sherman Act to state action and official action directed by the state, it
raised many unanswered questions. The Court did not define what
constitutes state action for Sherman Act purposes or what officials or
institutions can be considered state actors. Particular problems arise
concerning the application of the state action doctrine to activities of
municipalities, state agencies, other state political subdivisions and
even ostensibly private conduct. The decisions below have attempted
to deal with these problems.
B.

Application of the State Action Doctrine

The Parker holding was dormant for over thirty years before it
was rediscovered in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.15 In Goldfarb, the
Court held that a local county bar association's 16 activity of publishing
10. 317 U.S. at 346.
11.Id. at 350. However, the Court stated that the state cannot give immunity to private
parties who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring their action
lawful. Id. at 351-52. (See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)). A state
or its municipalities can become participants in an illegal private agreement with third parties to
restrain trade. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
12. 317 U.S. at 351.
13. Id.

14. Id.
15. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. The county bar association in Goldfarb was a purely voluntary association of attorneys
having no formal powers to enforce its list of recommended minimum prices for common legal
services. 421 U.S. at 776.
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a minimum fee schedule for lawyers, which was enforced by the Virginia State Bar, was not exempt from the Sherman Act. 17 The Virginia
State Bar is the administrative agency through which the Virginia
Supreme Court regulates the practice of law in Virginia.18 The county
bar association, which was a private entity, argued that the ethical
codes and activities of the Virginia State Bar "prompted"' 9 it to issue
fee schedules. Thus, the county bar association contends, its actions
were state action for Sherman Act purposes and therefore shielded
under the state action doctrine. 20 The Court, unpersuaded, held that
anticompetitive activity must be "compelled" by the state acting as sovereign and not just "prompted" by it2l in order for the activity to fall
within the state action doctrine. What proved dispositive in Goldfarb
was the fact that the Virginia Supreme Court's ethical codes did not
direct or require the Virginia State Bar Association or the county bar
association to supply and enforce minimum fee schedules. 22 Hence, the
county bar association's challenged activity could not have been state
action.
In contrast to Goldfarb, the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,23 upheld the Arizona Bar's 24 disciplinary rules that restricted
lawyer advertising. 25 These rules were expressly adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court and enforced by it.26 This contrasts with Gold17. Id. at 791.
18. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1972).
19. 421 U.S. at 790. The local county bar, to support its position, asserted that the Virginia
State Bar had published reports condoning fee schedules and had issued two ethical opinions
indicating that fee schedules could not be ignored. Id. at 776-77. The most recent opinion at the
time stated that "evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum
fee schedule adopted by his local bar Association, raises a presumption that such a lawyer is guilty
of misconduct .
"I.
Id. at 778, quoting,Virginia State Bar Comm.on Legal Ethics, Opinion No.
170 (May 28, 1971). Notwithstanding, the Virginia Supreme Court, through its own rules, has
never explicitly adopted the bar's ethical opinions concerning minimum fee schedules, but, it has
admonished lawyers not "to be controlled" by fee schedules. 421 U.S. at 789-90 n.19.
20. Id. at 790.
21. Id. at 791.
22. Id.
23. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
24. As in Goldfarb, the Arizona State Bar was an administrative arm of the Arizona Supreme
Court. The Arizona State Bar was created pursuant to Rule 27(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17A at 84-85 (1973).
25. The disciplinary rule provides in part:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or
telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or
permit others to do so in his behalf.
Disciplinary Rule 201(B) incorporated in Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17A at 26 (Supp. 1976).
26. 433 U.S. at 361.
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farb, where the Virginia Supreme Court did not adopt the state bar's
27
publishing and enforcement of the challenged minimum fee schedule.
Thus, the restraints on certain attorney practices in Bates, unlike in
Goldfarb, was imposed by the state's highest court wielding the power
of the state. As a result, the Bates Court found that the Arizona Bar's
disciplinary rules reflected a state policy that was "clearly and affirmatively expressed and actively supervised" by the state. 28 Hence, the disciplinary rules of the Arizona Bar fell within the state action doctrine
29
and were therefore exempt from the antitrust laws.
The state's "active supervision" or lack of it over alleged anticompetitive conduct significantly influenced the outcome of two additional
Supreme Court cases. In New Motor Vehicle Board of Californiav. Orrin W Fox Co. ,30 the Court found that a California program which
required state approval of the location of new automobile dealerships
to be protected under the state action doctrine. The program provided
that the state would hold a hearing if an automobile franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a competing dealership. 3' In
view of the state's active role, the Court held the program was not subject to the Sherman Act. 32 However, in CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. ,33 the Court held that a California statute 34 that implemented a wine pricing system constituted illegal
resale price maintenance 35 in violation of the Sherman Act. Under the
pricing system the state simply authorized price setting and enforced
the prices established by private parties. 36 The state did not establish
prices, review the reasonableness of the prices, or engage in any
27. 421 U.S. at 791.
28. 433 U.S. at 362.
29. Id. at 363.
30. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
31. See CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 3062, 3063 (West Supp. 1978).
32. 439 U.S. at 110-11.
33. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
34. The statute provides in part:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and rectifier shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers for which his
resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by the person who owns or
controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale prices, if he
owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 24866 (West 1964).
35. Typically, a resale price maintenance agreement is an agreement between a manufacturer
and retailer in which the latter cannot resell the manufacturer's product below a specified minimum price. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
36. 445 U.S. at 105.
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"pointed reexamination" of the program. 37 The Court therefore concluded that although the program was a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy," it violated the Sherman Act because it
38
was not "actively supervised" by the state itself.
City of LaFayette v. LouisianaPower and Light Co. 39was the first
antitrust case which involved municipal defendants to reach the
Supreme Court. In Lafayette, the municipal 4° defendants were authorized by state law4' to own and operate electric utility systems both
within and beyond their city limits. The municipalities competed in
areas beyond their city limits with Louisiana Power and Light Co.
(LP&L), a privately owned electric utility. 42 The municipalities filed
suit against LP&L43 alleging that LP&L commited various antitrust offenses which injured the municipalities in the operation of their electric
utility systems. LP&L counterclaimed, 44 seeking damages and injunctive relief for various antitrust offenses which the municipalities had
45
allegedly commited.
The municipalities moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the
ground that, as cities and political subdivisions of the State of Louisiana, the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown rendered federal antitrust laws inapplicable to them. The Court, in a plurality decision, held
that municipalities, simply by their status as such, are not protected by
the Parker doctrine.4 6 The Court explained that the Parker doctrine
37. Id. at 106.
38. Id. at 105.
39. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
40. For detailed treatments regarding municipalities, see generally J. DILLON, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911); E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1977).
41. See LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 7(A); LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIV, § 40(d). See generally
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:621, 33:361, 33:506 (West 1951).
42. 435 U.S. at 392.
43. The complaint also named as defendants Middle-South Utilities, Inc., a Florida corporation of which LP&L is a subsidiary, Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc. and Gulf States Utilities.
The latter two companies are Louisiana and Texas corporations, respectively, and are engaged in
the generation, transmission, and sale of electric power at wholesale and retail in Louisiana. 435
U.S. at 391 n.3.
44. The counterclaim, as amended, alleged a conspiracy between the City of Lafayette and
other municipalities and a nonparty electric cooperative to
1) engage in sham litigation against LP&L to prevent the financing with the purpose and effect of delaying or preventing the construction of a nuclear generating plant;
2) eliminate competition within the municipal boundaries by use of covenants in
their respective debentures;
3) exclude competition in certain markets by using long-term supply agreements;
and
4) displace LP&L in certain areas by requiring customers of LP&L to purchase
electricity from defendants as a condition of continued water and gas service.
435 U.S. at 392 n.6.
45. 435 U.S. at 392.
46. Id. at 408-11 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J., plurality).
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exempts only "anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the state as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public
service. '4 7 The Court noted that "pursuant to state policy" does not
mean that a political subdivision must be able to point to a specific,
detailed legislative authorization before it properly may assert a Parker
defense to an antitrust suit. 48 Rather, an adequate state mandate for
anticompetitive activities of municipalities exists when it is found
"from the authority given [it] to operate in a particular area, that the
legislature contemplated the kind of [anticompetitive conduct] com' 49
plained of."
Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion concurring in part and in result, considered the issue before the Court to be whether the Sherman
Act reaches the proprietary enterprises of municipalities.5 0 In determining the applicability of the state action doctrine in such circum47. 435 U.S. at 413. The Court did not state whether a municipality's or other political subdivision's anticompetitive conduct must be "actively supervised" by the state. The Supreme Court
cases which have mandated active state supervision dealt with private party defendants seeking
protection under the state action doctrine. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96 (1978). In such circumstances, the Court probably reasoned that greater state involvement
in the anticompetitive conduct is necessary than mere state authorization of the private party's
conduct. Presumably, this would insure that the private party follows the articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy that was involved.
Professor Areeda believes that Lafayette does not require governmental acts to be actively
supervised by the state. Areeda, supra note 3, at 445. However, several lower court decisions have
required active supervision of a challenged municipality's or other political subdivision's conduct.
Eg., Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1981-1 Trade Cas.) 64,209
(D. Colo. Oct. 9, 1980), order modoed, No. 80-A-752 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 1980); Scott v. City of
Sioux City, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1983-1 Trade Cas.) 65,352 (N.D. Iowa May 3, 1983);
Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D. Iowa 1979), af'd in
part and rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1981). Contra Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v.
City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1014-15 (8th Cir.), petitionfor cert.filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3039
(U.S. July 25, 1983) (No. 83-138); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 383 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3891 (U.S. June 11, 1984) (No. 82-1832); Central Iowa Refuse
Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 428 (8th Cir.
1983), petitionfor cert.filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1983) (No. 83-825); Capital Telephone Co., Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 560 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 565 F. Supp. 169, 172 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Hybud Equip. Corp.
v. City of Akron, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1983-1 Trade Cas.)
65,356 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 6,
1983).
48. 435 U.S. at 415.
49. Id., quoting, City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434
(5th Cir. 1976).
50. 435 U.S. at 422. A municipality is acting in a proprietary manner when it "performs
[services] which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it
collects revenue from it." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971). The Chief Justice
stated that he used the term "proprietary" to highlight the competitive relationship between the
parties in Lafayette. 435 U.S. at 422 n.3. In fact, the Chief Justice termed this case to be "an
ordinary dispute among competitors in the same market." Id. at 419.
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stances, the Chief Justice agreed with the plurality that "the threshold
inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of
the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the
activity is required by the State acting as sovereign."' 5 1 However, on
remand, the Chief Justice would require the district court to supplement the plurality's inquiry by determining "whether the implied exemption from federal law was necessary to make the (state regulation)
work."' 52 Implicit in the Chief Justice's opinion is the apparent blanket
immunity from the antitrust laws he would give to nonproprietary municipal action.
In sum, the above line of cases delineate the parameters of "state
action" for Sherman Act purposes. In all instances when a state is acting in its sovereign capacity, it is absolutely immune from the antitrust
laws. In contrast, municipalities and other state political subdivisions
do not enjoy this blanket immunity from the antitrust laws. They must
show that their anticompetitive conduct was made pursuant to a "state
53
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly service."
51. 435 U.S. at 425, quoting, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
52. 435 U.S. at 426. The Chief Justice also would require a strong showing on the part of the
municipal defendant that the state intended it to displace competition with regulation. Justice
Burger disagreed with the plurality that the state only need "contemplate" the anticompetitive
activities undertaken by a municipality. Rather, the Chief Justice would require the state to compel the anticompetitive conduct of the municipalities. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice joined the
judgment of the Court and the directions of the remand "because they (represented) at a minimum" what should be demanded of the defendants. Id. at 425 n.6.
53. 435 U.S. at 413. For cases involving state political subdivisions that have found state
action present, see, e.g., Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid
Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 428 (8th Cir.),petitionforcer.filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Nov. 18,
1983) (No. 83-825) (several municipalities acting in concert to develop and implement a comprehensive solid waste collection and disposal scheme); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of
Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir.),petitionforcert.filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. July 25,
1983) (No. 83-138) (municipal implementation of a quasi-public monopoly ambulance service);
Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 811 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, No.
82-355 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1983) (denial of license to fixed base operator to operate at a municipal
airport); Community Builders v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1981) (municipal
water allocation system); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 565 F. Supp. 169,
171-72 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (city's failure to renew plaintiff's operating license to operate cab in city);
Capital Telephone Co., Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 560 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (city's
denial of private company from establishing phone company); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc., v.
Pennroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543, 545 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (awarding of cable franchise);
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1983-1 Trade Cas.)
65,356
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 1983) (city ordinance regarding solid waste collection and disposal); Highfield
Water Company v. Public Service Comm'n, 488 F. Supp. 1176, 1190-91 (D. Md. 1980) (municipality's purchase of private water company); Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Mass.
1980) (displacement of plaintiff's transit system with a public monopoly). Several lower courts
have also found certain municipal and other state political subdivisions' actions not protected
under the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664, 668 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (horizontal boycott between baseball team and city to
deny plaintiff permission to schedule events competing with team); Westborough Mall v. City of
Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Drury v. Westborough
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It is not clear whether a municipality's anticompetitive conduct must
also be actively supervised by the state. 54 A private party's anticompetitive conduct will be exempt from the Sherman Act under the state
action doctrine if it satisfies the above criteria, as well as showing that
its conduct was compelled 55 and actively supervised by the state.
II.

COMMUNITY COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. V. CITY OF
BOULDER DECISION

Four years after the Lafayette decision, the Supreme Court confronted another municipal antitrust case in Community Communications
Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder.56 Boulder presented the Court with two
novel facts in the state action line of cases. First, the municipal defendant (City of Boulder) was a "home rule" municipality acting pursuant
to its delegated powers. Secondly, the municipality's challenged conduct did not involve a proprietary function. This section will examine
the Boulder holding and discuss its significance.
A.

57
FactualBackground

In Boulder, the City of Boulder was a home rule municipality5 8
under the Constitution 59 of the State of Colorado. The city is thus entitled to exercise "the full right of self-government in both local and muMall, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2122 (1983) (municipality's attempt to thwart normal zoning procedures not
protected under the state action doctrine); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 485
F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D.Iowa 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1981)
(denial of rezoning request).
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55. The Supreme Court and the lower courts have not been consistent in applying the "compulsion" criterion. The Supreme Court in Midcal did not explicitly mention "compulsion" though
the defendants were private parties. California Retail Liquor Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445
U.S. 97 (1980). Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Southern Motor Carrier Rate
Conferences, 672 F.2d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1982), interpreted Midcal as still requiring state compulsion in order for a private party to invoke the state action doctrine. See generally Note, Parkerv.
Brown Revisited The State Action Doctrineafter Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
898, 916 (1977). But see Areeda, supra note 3. Areeda believes that the courts have not "applied
the compulsion language literally." Rather, the "lower courts employ the rhetoric of compulsion
but immunize private action that is essential to a state regulatory scheme." 1d. at 438 n.8.
56. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
57. The facts of the case discussed in the text can be found at 455 U.S. at 43-48.
58. For a discussion on the nature and characteristics of "home rule" municipalities, see generally C. ANTIEAU, I MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.00 (1982); E.MCQUILLIN, supra note 40,
§§ 3.09, 4.62.
59. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment provides in part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants. . . are hereby vested with and they shall always have, power to make, amend,
add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be organic law and extend
to all its local and municipal matters.
COLO. CONST. art. XX § 6.
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nicipal matters" 60 and with respect to such matters the City Charter
and ordinances supersede the laws of the state. In 1964 the Boulder
City Council enacted an ordinance granting to Colorado Televerts, Inc.
a 20 year, revocable, nonexclusive permit to conduct a cable television
(CATV) business within the city limits. This permit was assigned to
Community Communications Co., Inc. (CCC) in 1966.
In May 1979, CCC informed Boulder that it planned to expand its
business into other areas of the city. In July 1979, Boulder Communication Company (BCC) also informed the city council of its interest in
obtaining a permit to provide competing cable television services
throughout the city. The city council in response to these developments
announced a three month moratorium that prohibited CCC from expanding its business into other areas of the city while the council
drafted a model cable television ordinance. The city council claimed
that CCC's continued expansion during the drafting of the model ordinance would discourage potential competitors from entering the
61
market.
In response to the three month building moratorium imposed on
it, CCC filed suit against Boulder seeking a preliminary injunction to
prevent the moratorium from becoming effective. CCC alleged that the
moratorium was in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 62 Boulder responded that its moratorium ordinance did not violate the Sherman Act because it was protected under the state action doctrine.
The district court found that the regulation of CATV was beyond
Boulder's home rule powers. 63 The court further held that even if the
moratorium ordinance was within Boulder's authority, the state action
doctrine was "wholly inapplicable" to Boulder. 64 Therefore, Boulder
was subject to the Sherman Act and the court granted CCC its motion
60. 445 U.S. at 44.
61. The preamble to the city's model cable television ordinance reads in part:
[T]he City Council intends to adopt a model cable television permit ordinance, solicit
applications from interested cable television companies, evaluate such applications, and
determine whether or not to grant additional permits. . . [within] 3 months, and finds
that an extension of service by [CCC] would result in a disruption of this application and
evaluation process; and. . . the City Council finds that placing temporary geographical
limitations upon the operations of [CCC] would not impair the present services offered
by [it] to City of Boulder residents, and would not impair [its] ability . . . to improve
those services within the area presently served by it.
BOULDER, COLO., ORDINANCE No. 4473 (1979).

62. CCC alleged that a conspiracy to restrain trade existed between the City of Boulder and
BCC. 455 U.S. at 47 n.9.
63. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D. Colo.
1980).
64. Id. at 1039.
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for a preliminary injunction. 65
On appeal, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The majority disagreed with the district court
that the regulation of CATV was beyond Boulder's home rule powers. 66 The court also distinguished Boulder from Lafayette, noting that
Lafayette dealt with municipalities engaged in proprietary functions,
while in Boulder no proprietary interests of the City of Boulder were
implicated. 67 As such, the court found Boulder's regulation to be an
adequate expression of governmental policy concerning an active supervision of the CATV industry to satisfy the criteria for the applica68
tion of the state action doctrine.
B.

Supreme Court Holding

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision and
agreed with the district court that the City of Boulder was subject to the
Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court held that Boulder's moratorium ordinance
cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny "unless it constitutes the action of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity" or "unless
it constitutes municipal action in furtherance or implementation of a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."'69 The City
of Boulder argued that its home rule powers, in essence, gave it sovereign power over local and municipal matters. 70 Therefore, any action
by the city made pursuant to its home rule powers-i.e., the moratorium ordinance-was state action and hence shielded from the antitrust
laws. 71 The Court rejected this contention that the "Home Rule" statute granted municipalities sovereign powers, noting that only the state
and federal government are sovereigns, not municipalities. 7 2 Alternatively, Boulder contended that the requirement of "clear articulation
and affirmative expression" was fulfilled by the Colorado Home Rule
Amendment's "guarantee of local autonomy. ' 73 This amendment,
Boulder argued, indicated that Colorado, by granting the city power to
65. Id.

66. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 707 (10th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 708.

68. Id.
69. 455 U.S. at 52.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
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enact the challenged ordinance, contemplated its enactment. 74 The
Court also rejected this argument, stating that Colorado was merely
neutral regarding the challenged conduct and that mere neutrality was
'75
not "a clear articulation and affirmative expression of state policy.
Thus, the Court rejected the proposition that a general grant of power
to a municipality to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authori76
zation to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances.
The three dissenting justices 77 in Boulder considered the majority's
interpretation of Parker and the state action doctrine seriously
flawed. 78 The dissent argued that the majority erred in identifying the
issue to be whether the state action doctrine exempts 79 Boulder's challenged conduct from the Sherman Act.8 0 The dissent contended that
the state action doctrine does not create an exemption from the Sherman Act, but rather implicates federal preemption principles. 8' Federal preemption analysis is implicated when courts examine "the
interplay between the enactments of two different sovereigns---one federal and the other state."' 82 If the court finds that a state or local law
directly conflicts with federal law, the state law is preempted by the
federal law through the operation of the supremacy clause. 83 Where
premption is found, the state law is rendered void. The dissenters, contrasting preemption with exemption, noted that exemption involves
only the "interplay between the enactments of a single sovereign"
rather than between two sovereigns. 84 The state action doctrine, the
dissent stated, involved the "enactment of two different sovereigns"specifically, state and local regulations which purportedly conflict with
federal antitrust laws. Thus, the dissent would use a preemption analysis in Boulder and would frame the issue as "whether statutes, ordinances, and regulations enacted [by the local government] are
74. Id.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id.
77. Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting.
78. 455 U.S. at 60.
79. It is not clear that the majority considered the state action doctrine to be an exemption.
For articles that discuss the nature of the state action doctrine, see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
80. 455 U.S. at 61.
81. Id. See generally Note, Parker v. Brown:. A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164
(1975).
82. 455 U.S. at 61, quoting, HandlerAntitrust-1978,78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1379 (1978).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI. A state law is also preempted under the supremacy clause, where
the law regulates a field that the federal government has intended to occupy exclusively so as to
foreclose any state regulation. See generally, G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 5, (10th ed.
1980).
84. 455 U.S. at 61.
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preempted by the Sherman Act under the operation of the Supremacy
Clause." 8 5
Under the dissent's analysis, the validity of a municipal ordinance
would be tested under the state action doctrine, but its consequences
would be different from the majority's. A challenged ordinance or statute would be found valid if it were enacted pursuant to an affirmative
policy on the part of the municipality to restrain competition and that
the municipality supervise and implement this policy. 86 If the ordinance did not meet this test, it would be preempted by the Sherman Act
and, as a result, rendered void. 87 Therefore, municipalities would
avoid any antitrust liability under the preemption analysis.
C

Significance of the Boulder Decision

The Boulder decision is important because a majority of the Court
held for the first time that "home rule" municipalities are not immune
from the Sherman Act, though the municipality may be acting pursuant to its delegated authority from the state. Justice Blackmun, who
dissented in Lafayette, provided the key swing vote in Boulder. In Lafayette, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Stewart's dissent that
municipal action-proprietary or nonproprietary-generally is immune from the antitrust laws. 88 However, Justice Blackmun would
deny such immunity if a municipality was found to have been acting in
concert with private parties to unlawfully restrain trade. 89 Therefore,
Justice Blackmun's vote in Boulder was completely consonant with his
dissent in Lafayette because of the alleged conspiracy to restrain trade
between the City of Boulder and BCC, a private corporation.
As a result of Boulder, municipal decision-makers must be wary of
enacting "anticompetitive" ordinances that favor one private competitor over another. Due to the liberal pleading requirements in antitrust
actions, 90 the "injured" competitor could easily bring an action by
pleading that the ordinance is evidence of a conspiracy between his
competitor and the municipality to restrain trade. Although the likeli85. Id.
86. Id. at 68. The dissent significantly alters the test developed under the state action doctrine. All previous tests required the state or its officials to be acting in their sovereign capacity for
the state action doctrine to be implicated. The dissent apparently does not require the state to be
acting in its sovereign capacity but only that a municipality be acting in an authorized manner for
the state action doctrine to be implicated.
87. Id.
88. 435 U.S. at 442 (dissent).
89. Id.
90. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1202,
1228, 1286 (1969).
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hood of success on the merits may be doubtful, such cases, even in the
preliminary stages, will consume valuable time and resources of the
municipal defendant.
The Boulder decision also takes Lafayette one step farther. In Lafayette, the municipalities were clearly engaged in proprietary activity,
while in Boulder the municipality was engaged in governmental conduct (enactment of the moratorium ordinance). Boulder thus broadens
the reach of the antitrust laws to encompass a larger scope of municipal
activity than under Lafayette.
The courts will now be confronted with the dual problems of applying the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act to claimed municipal anticompetitive conduct, as well as the possibility of assessing
treble damages against a municipal violator. These problems will be
examined in the next two sections.
III.

APPLICATION OF SECTION

1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT IN

MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST CASES

The Supreme Court has yet to decide a municipal antitrust case on
the merits. Boulder has been remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in that case.
Thus, the lower courts will be faced with the task of applying the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act to the claimed anticompetitive
conduct of a municipality. Past precedent gives little guidance as to
how the courts will deal with the unique problems that may arise in a
municipal antitrust context or how the courts may modify the traditional antitrust analysis used with private defendants. Regardless of
how the courts choose to analyze a municipality's alleged anticompetitive conduct, section 1 of the Sherman Act makes clear that to prevail,
a plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct affected interstate commerce, or was pursuant to a combination, contract, or conspiracy and
restrained trade. 9 ' This section will discuss the analytical problems of
applying these elements of section 1 in the context of a municipal anti92
trust case.
91. Kendrick v. City Council of Augusta, Ga., 516 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
92. In private antitrust suits, damages comprise an important element of a Sherman Act § I
action. Nonetheless, a discussion of proving up damages by a private plaintiff in a municipal
antitrust suit is being omitted. Damages will be discussed in the next section but only with respect
to the likelihood of the court's assessing treble damages against a municipality. Additionally,
there will be no discussion concerning the availability of equitable remedies to plaintiffs in
municipal antitrust cases.
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A.

Interstate Commerce Requirement

The Sherman Act was enacted pursuant to the authority granted to
Congress by the commerce clause. 93 Therefore, the jurisdictional reach
of the Sherman Act is equal to Congress' constitutional powers to regulate commerce. 94 Jurisdiction under the Act has expanded along with
the expanding notion of Congress' power under the commerce clause. 95
Due to this expansion, the Sherman Act covers not only activities in
interstate commerce, 96 but also intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 97 Although there have been cases holding
that a particular intrastate activity does not substantially affect commerce, 98 the reach of the "substantially affects" doctrine into intrastate
activity is broad. 99 For example, in HospitalBuilding Co. v. Trustees of
Rex Hospital,t°° the operator of a small hospital in Raleigh, North
Carolina, brought suit against Rex Hospital, alleging that Rex had conspired with others to block the proposed expansion of plaintiffs hospital and to monopolize hospital services in Raleigh. The Supreme Court
held that defendant's activity substantially affected interstate commerce
because it reduced plaintiffs out of state medical purchases, insurance
revenues, financing for expansion, and payment of management fees to
93. Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065, 1073 (E.D.
Pa. 1982).
94. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977).
95. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
96. E.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). The interstate
commerce requirement can be satisfied by a showing that defendant's activities were in the "flow
of interstate commerce." For example, in Goldfarb, real estate purchasers challenged the Virginia
State Bar's minimum fee schedule for real estate title searches. The Supreme Court held that
interstate commerce was involved because title examinations by attorneys were an "integral" and
"inseparable" part of interstate real estate financing. 421 U.S. at 784-85.
97. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. at 241; Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S 738, 743 (1976); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1144 (8th Cir. 1981); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n,
Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1981).
98. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (the transportation by local taxicabs of interstate train passengers between their homes and the railroad station was held not to be
in interstate commerce); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp.
1065, 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (the ordinary denial of physician's hospital staff privilege does not
substantially affect interstate commerce).
99. For "substantially affects" cases, see, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444
U.S. 232 (1980) (alleged price fixing conspiracy among local real estate brokers was held to affect
interstate commerce); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (statewide wholesaler's territorial division was found to inevitably affect interstate commerce); James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 677 F.2d I 11I(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 374 (1983) (conspiracy to require conformance with fixed rate of labor of local independent masonry contractors in Detroit
was held to affect interstate commerce).
100. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
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plaintiff's out of state parent corporation.101
A municipality's power and authority are generally limited to its
local jurisdiction, thus most municipal action probably will be intrastate in character. However, before determining if a municipality's
conduct substantially affects interstate commerce, the court must decide
what conduct must be scrutinized in order to determine if jurisdiction
exists. Currently, the courts are split between scrutinizing defendant's
challenged conduct's effect on interstate commerce 10 2 or the defendant's general business activity's10 3 effect on interstate commerce.
Under the latter and more liberal approach, few municipal defendants
would be able to assert that jurisdiction does not exist. It is difficult to
imagine a municipality that does not engage in any activity that substantialy affects interstate commerce. However, even under the former
and more restrictive approach, municipal conduct can easily be found
to affect interstate commerce. For example, municipal ordinances that
have restricted the number of taxis servicing a regional airport,' ° 4 the
right of an individual to sell alcohol in a municipality, 10 5 and the area
where refuse could be dumped' 0 6 have all been found to substantially
affect interstate commerce.
B.
tion

Conspiracy Requirement

Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "[e]very contract, combina0 7 Implicit
. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce."

101. Id. at 744. Plaintiff purchased 80% of its medicines and supplies from out of state vendors. In 1972, plaintiff spent $112,000 on such items. Id. at 741.
102. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1280 (7th
Cir. 1983); Cordova & Simonpietri Insurance v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36, 45 (1st Cir.
1981); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 724 (10th Cir. 1981); Pao v. Holy
Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester
Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See generally Note, The Interstate Commerce Testfor Jurisdiction in Sherman Act Cases and Its Substantive Applications, 15 GA. L. REV.
714 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1983); Western Waste Service v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094,
1097 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259, 1285
(W.D. Pa. 1983); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 127 (E.D. Ky. 1982);
Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815, 820-21 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
104. Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (municipality's
adoption of an ordinance to restrict the number of taxi companies permitted to service a large
regional airport was found to affect interstate commerce because 90% of the fares were from out of
state).
105. Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (municipality refused to grant plaintiff
a zoning permit to sell alcohol within the municipality).
106. Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste
Agency, 557 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aft'd, 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.,petitionfor cert.filed, 52
U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1983) (No. 83-825).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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in section 1 is the requirement that two or more people agree to restrain
trade. 0 8 However, certain unilateral business practices do come within
the purview of section 1. This section will generally discuss the application of the conspiracy requirement in a municipal antitrust context

and what, if any, unilateral activities on the part of municipalities fall
within section 1.
The conspiracy requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act will
make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail against a municipal defendant
if they simply assert that some unilateral municipal conduct was anticompetitive. As previously noted, one element of a section 1 violation
is the requirement that two or more parties have agreed to restrain
trade. This has meant that a private corporation generally cannot combine with itself, its officers, or its employees to restrain trade. 0 9 Therefore, a municipality should not be able to combine with itself or its
employees to restrain trade. The conspiracy requirement also precludes the possibility of a conspiracy between unincorporated divisions
within a single corporation.' " 0 Similarly, it is evident that departments
within the same municipal government should not be able to conspire
with each other or its municipal government to restrain trade.
However, a municipality can conspire with another independent
governmental unit to restrain trade. For example, Corey v. Look"' involved an alleged conspiracy between the Town of Falmouth, Massachusetts, and the Nantucket Steamship Authority (Authority) to
monopolize the parking lot market in Falmouth. In Corey, the Authority terminated plaintiff's (a private party) contract to operate a parking
108. The requirement of two or more persons was made clear in Union Pacific Coal Co. v.
United States, 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909). The court stated that "The union of two or more persons, the conscious participation in the scheme of two or more minds, is indispensable to an unlawful combination, and it cannot be created by the action of one man alone." Id. at 745. There
appears little technical difference between a combination and conspiracy. The Supreme Court, in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), used the terms interchangeably. Id. at 142. The fine technical distinctions between a contract, combination, and conspiracy do not appear to be dispositive to the application of § 1. 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW § 9.4 (1980).
109. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). See, e.g., Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d
391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974); Terry's Floor Fashion v. Burlington Indus., 568 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.N.C.
1983).
110. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962). In Poller, the Court held plaintiff's assertion that CBS unlawfully conspired with one of its divisions "obviously unsound" because "[tit is in reality a charge
that CBS conspired with itself." Id. at 603. See Joseph E Seagrams & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1969); New Amsterdam
Cheese Corp. v. Kraftco Corp., 363 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
111. 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981).
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lot in Falmouth.' 1 2 Falmouth then awarded a contract to the Authority
to operate parking lots within the town. This occurred despite the fact
that the plaintiff allegedly outbid the Authority for the contract. "1 3 Additionally, through the use of severe regulation, the two defendants
hampered plaintiffs ability to use land that he obtained from other
sources as a parking lot in Falmouth. 1 4 The court stated that "such
conduct, on its face amounted to a concerted refusal to deal with a
disfavored purchaser."' 15
1. INTRA-MUNICIPAL CONSPIRACY. The conspiracy issue becomes more complex when the alleged conspirators are a municipality
and an entity created by the municipality. Municipalities frequently
have the power to create and delegate some of their powers to special
districts, zoning boards and other agencies." 16 These entities, in their
daily operations, are often autonomous from their municipal creator.
This relationship is somewhat analogous to that of a subsidiary
corporation to its parent corporation. A parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary, as well as two commonly controlled corporations, are capable of conspiring with one another to restrain trade.' ' 7 (This is commonly referred to as an intra-corporate conspiracy.) Although the
conspiracy, in reality, involves only one consolidated corporation, a
conspiracy can, nevertheless, exist because each conspirator is a separate legal entity."l 8 Due to the conspirators' separate legal identities,
each is treated as any other individual entity and is thus considered
amenable to the antitrust laws.' 19
112. Id. at 34.
113. Id. Falmouth made bid information and other confidential information available to the
Authority prior to the Authority's bid for the operation of the parking lot. Id.
114. Id. at 36.
115. Id.
116. See E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 40, § 25.215.
117. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42
(1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218, 227 (1947).
118. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 117. See generally Handler & Smart, The PresentStatus
of the IntracorporateConspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981-82).
119. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392, U.S. 134, 141-42. The lower
courts are split regarding how they analyze intracorporate conspiracies. The First, Third, and
Fifth Circuits have held, as a matter of law, that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have
the capacity to conspire with one another solely from the fact of their separate incorporations.
Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 597 F.2d 20, 33-34 n.49 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H&B Equipment Co., Inc. v. International Harvester Co.,
577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,
508 F.2d 547, 557 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). The Second, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have held that the capacity of related corporations to conspire with each other
can only be determined after analyzing the facts and circumstances regarding the corporations'

MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST

The requirement of separate legal identity will not be met in most
"intra-municipal" conspiracies. The municipal created entity usually
will not have a separate legal personality from its municipality. Thus,
the created entity is more analogous to an unincorporated division than
a corporate subsidiary. An unincorporated division, regardless of the
autonomy it may have from the rest of the corporation, is not capable
of conspiring with other divisions or the corporation itself. 20 Therefore, unless a municipal created entity has a separate legal existence
from its municipality, no "intra-municipal" conspiracy can exist.
2. UNILATERAL ENACTMENTS OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. Many cases involving municipal defendants have dealt
with the enactment of an allegedly anticompetitive ordinance 2' that
has caused harm or injury to the plaintiff's business interests. A municipality's unilateral enactment of an ordinance, regardless of its anticompetitive impact, is missing the necessary element of concerted
action and hence should not violate the antitrust laws. Attempts to
analogize such unilateral activity to private unilateral conduct that violates the antitrust laws will be difficult.
However, that is what the district court1 2 2 in Boulder attempted to
do when it analogized the City of Boulder's three month moratorium
ordinance to an illegal resale price maintenance scheme (RPM). Typically, a resale price maintenance agreement is an agreement between a
manufacturer and retailer in which the latter cannot resell the manuinterrelatedness. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 651 F.2d
122, 126 (2d Cir. 1981); Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1424 (1982); Oglivie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 587-90 (8th Cir.
1981); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917, 958 (9th
Cir. 1981). The split may be resolved once the Court decides the Independence Tube case.
120. 284 F.2d at 603.
121. See, e.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982)
(change in zoning law which prevented plaintiff from building a shopping mall); Omni Outdoor
Advertising v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, 566 F. Supp. 1444 (D.S.C. 1983) (enactment of
zoning law which forbade plaintiff from erecting billboards within the municipality); Hybud
Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, TRADE REG. REP, (CCH) (1983-1 Trade Cas.) 65,356 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 6, 1983) (ordinance required all solid waste collected within city limits to be brought to
the city owned dump site).
122. 458 F. Supp. at 1039. The authorities cited by the district court do not support its position. For instance, the district court relied on Sahm v. V-I Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968),
where the defendant threatened to cancel plaintiffs lease because of plaintiffs failure to adhere to
defendant's pricing schedule. Plaintiff was instructed by defendant's agent that if plaintiff
changed prices his lease would not be cancelled. The court held this to be illegal resale price
maintenance, because the defendant was trying to coerce plaintiff, through threats of lease cancellation, to adhere to price scheme. Id. at 71. In Boulder, the city did not coerce plaintiff into doing
any illegal or anticompetitive conduct. Unlike Sahm, the City of Boulder did not set any preconditions which CCC must have met before the city would deal with it.
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facturer's product below a specified price. 123 It is lawful for a manufacturer to unilaterally refuse to deal with a retailer who fails to adhere to
a previously announced price schedule. 124 However, a resale price
maintenance scheme is unlawful in two circumstances: 1) where the
manufacturer attempts to secure adherence to its pricing practices
through coercion or threats, 25 or 2) when the manufacturer, in response to competing dealers' complaints of a discounting retailer, terminates the discounter. 26 Although the element of conspiracy is
apparently missing, the courts have nevertheless held such resale price
maintenance schemes to be per se violations 27 of the antitrust laws.
It is arguable that Boulder's moratorium ordinance may have anticompetitive consequences. Nevertheless, this possibility is not enough
to bring such unilateral enactments into the same status as unlawful
RPM schemes. The rationale for holding the latter unlawful is clearRPM is a form of price fixing, which the courts consider to be a particularly pernicious economic evil that the Sherman Act was intended to
rid. Therefore, the courts have been willing to liberalize their concept
of conspiracy in order to bring certain RPM practices under the proscriptions of the Sherman Act.
In contrast to RPM schemes, the moratorium ordinance does not
involve the discernible economic vices that are present in RPM
schemes. The ordinance neither affected plaintiffs ongoing business
operations (except for restrictions put on expanding its service) nor instructed or coerced plaintiff to engage in conduct that violated the anti123. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
124. Id.
125. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960); United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721-23, (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 451, 454-55 (1922).
126. Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 709 F.2d 1257, 1263 (9th Cir. 1983); Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1234 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249
(1983). See generally Piraino, DistributorTerminationsPursuantto ConspiraciesAmong a Supplier
and Complaining Distributors:.A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (1982);
Note, VerticalAgreements to Terminate Competing Distributors.: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1160 (1979).

127. It is clear that when a local government forces a private party to violate the antitrust laws,
it may implicate itself in an unlawful conspiracy. For example, in Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway &
Park District, 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), remandedfor reconsiderationin light ofLafayette, 435
U.S. 992 (1978), antitrustjudgment reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1090 (1979), a local park district, which operated five municipal golf courses, granted licenses to
private parties to operate the pro shops at each course. The plaintiffs, who individually had operated a pro shop, had their licenses terminated by the park district which, in turn, granted an
exclusive license to another party, Golf Shop Management, Inc. (GSM), to operate all the shops.
The plaintiffs alleged that their licenses were terminated and an exclusive license granted to GSM
because they refused to follow the park district's demand to raise and fix their retail prices. Id. at
587. The Seventh Circuit sustained the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the state action doctrine
does not authorize local governmental units "to force private competitors to violate the antitrust
laws." Id. at 590.
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trust laws. As a consequence, the rationale for liberalizing the
conspiracy requirements is absent in the Boulder case. Therefore, except for enactment of ordinances that sanction RPM or other violations
of the antitrust laws by private parties,128 unilateral enactment of ordinances should not fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act.
3. CONSPIRACY WITH PRIVATE PARTY. Typically, a plaintiff,
to satisfy the conspiracy requirement of section 1, will allege that a conspiracy exists between a municipality or its officials and a private party
to illegally restrain trade. The subject matter of these alleged conspiracies have included many "traditional" functions of local government
32
3
such as zoning,1 29 garbage collection, 130 transit systems, ' ' airports,
t3 3
134
35
parking lots,
taxi service,
and operation of sports arenas.'
The
plaintiffs in these cases frequently have lost in the political process (i.e.,
denial of zoning request or exclusive contract) to a competitor 36 and
now seek redress in the courts for their alleged injuries under the antitrust laws. Generally, the plaintiff will allege that the municipality conspired with plaintiffs competitors to enact legislation favorable to the
latter and to the detriment of the plaintiff.
A number of decisions have sustained conspiracy allegations
against municipal defendants, on the pleadings alone.' 37 Although the
128. 684 F.2d at 1234.
129. Omni Outdoor Advertising v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, 566 F. Supp. 1444, 1445
(D.S.C. 1983).
130. Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste
Agency, 557 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
131. Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
132. Guthrie v. Genesee County, N.Y., 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
133. Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (lst Cir. 1981).
134. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 563 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd, 726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1984).
135. Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664, 666 (S.D.
Ohio 1983).
136. See, e.g., Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1981)
(plaintiff's alleged denial of a zoning request by city was in furtherance of an anticompetitive
agreement with downtown developers to exclude competing shopping center developments from
Mason City); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City.of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff alleged city officials and private developers conspired to preclude competition by improperly altering zoning that would have permitted plaintiff to construct a mall; instead, development rights were given to the private developer defendant).
137. See supra notes 127, 133, 135-36 and accompanying text. See also Omni Outdoor Advertising v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444 (D.S.C. 1983) (conspiracy between municipality and private party to prevent plaintiff from effectively competing in billboard
market); Guthrie v. Genesee County, N.Y., 494 F. Supp. 950, 958 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (conspiracy
between Genesee County and its fixed base operator [a private party] of the county airport to
eliminate and prevent plaintiff's air carrier business at airport); Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (conspiracy between municipalities and taxicab company to restrain trade in taxi service for Dallas-Fort Worth regional airport).
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conspiracy allegation may be dubious, it is doubtless that complaints
will often be sustained due to the liberal pleading policies under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and the antitrust laws. However,
at trial, for a plaintiff to prevail, he must prove that the municipality
and private party defendants were acting in concert to achieve their
allegedly unlawful goals.139 In cases where a private party simply prevailed upon a municipality to act favorably to it, though at the expense
of the plaintiff, a conspiracy claim should be without substance. Otherwise, an inference of conspiracy could always be raised after a private
party consulted with or petitioned the municipality to take action
favorable to it and against a competitor. Moreover, the Noerr-Pennington140 doctrine exempts concerted efforts by the private parties to
induce governmental action41--even if the purpose and effect of the
concerted activities is to eliminate competition 42 from the antitrust
laws.
In situations where a private party and a municipality have, in
fact, conspired together to eliminate or restrain competition, the plaintiff will be faced with the same proof problems present as in any antitrust case. However, it will often be a difficult line to draw between a
municipality that is simply listening and responding to various competitors' suggestions and requests, and a municipality that is acting in concert with a private party to unlawfully restrain trade.
138. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
139. Jonnet Development Corp. v. Caliguiri, 558 F. Supp. 962, 964 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
140. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a shorthand term used to represent the antitrust immunity that was created in the two seminal antitrust cases of Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965). See generally Fischel, Antitrust Liabilityfor Attempts to Influence Government Action:
The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 (1977).
141. 365 U.S. at 136-38. When the concerted activities occur in an adjudicatory setting, they
are also protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine so long as such activities are legitimate.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972).
142. 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). Municipal defendants have also successfully invoked the NoerrPennington doctrine in adjudicatory settings. In Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617
F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980), the City of Rochester was owner of a commercial tract of land that was
allegedly suitable for a shopping center. Plaintiff, who had proposed building a shopping center
on a competing parcel of land, alleged that the city instituted various "sham" proceedings to delay
the progress of plaintiffs shopping center. The court held that Rochester's actions did not fall
under the "sham" exception, but was entitled to immunity under Noerr-Pennington. Id. at 21. In
City of Gainesville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1980), a private
electric utility, Florida Power & Light, (FP&L) filed a counterclaim against various Florida municipalities, alleging that the municipalities engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to injure FP&L's
business. The municipalities allegedly commenced litigation and other adjudicatory proceedings
with the purpose of coercing and harassing FP&L into agreeing to various demands of the municipalities. The court held the municipalities' conduct immune from the antitrust laws under NoerrPennington. Id. at 1266.
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C. Rule of Reason Analysis
The Sherman Act does not prohibit all agreements that restrain
14 3
trade but only those agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.
The reasonableness of a challenged agreement is determined under the
Rule of Reason. 44 The chief inquiry under the Rule of Reason is
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes or suppresses
competition. 45 Generally, courts will go into a detailed analysis of the
challenged restraint, the facts peculiar to the industry to which the restraint is imposed, the nature of the restraint and its probable or actual
effect on competition to determine its reasonableness. 146 However, the
courts have identified certain restraints that are so anticompetitive in
nature that no detailed analysis is needed-such restraints are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. 14 7 These restraints are classified
asper se violations of the Sherman Act.14 8 This section will discuss the
application of the Rule of Reason and per se rule to alleged anticompetitive conduct on the part of municipalities.
As previously noted, under the Rule of Reason the court analyzes
a challenged restraint's impact on competition to determine its lawful49
ness. It is no defense to allege that competition itself is unreasonable
because it might allegedly impact adversely on safety considerations 5 0
or ethical behavior.' 5 1 This is said to reflect the national economic
policy that competition is the best method for allocating scarce resources in a free market.' 52 The Lafayette Court believed that Congress did not intend to permit municipalities to place their own
143. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972).
144. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
145. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
146. Id. at 690.
147. Id. at 692. For a discussion of restraints of trade that are illegal per se, see generally 2 E.
KINTNER, supra note 108, § 10.
148. 435 U.S. at 692.
149. Id. at 695.
150. Id.
151. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 495-96 (E.D. Va. 1973).
152. 435 U.S. at 695. The importance of the Sherman Act in implementing competitive values
was noted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972):
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how
small, is the freedom to compete--to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion
that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the economy.
Id. at 610.
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economic self-interests above this national policy. 153 Therefore, under
the Rule of Reason municipalities will be unable to defend their challenged conduct on the basis of legitimate safety, health, and welfare
considerations of their communities. Yet circumstances may arise
where local intervention in the marketplace is needed, even with its
54
possible anticompetitive effects.'
The substantive analysis under the Sherman Act will have to be
altered if municipalities are to be permitted to justify their anticompetitive conduct on non-economic grounds. The debates of the Act indicated a congressional intent to allow the courts to develop governing
155
principles of law with respect to substantive violations of the Act.
The Court, drawing on its discretion, has altered its analysis to accommodate non-economic factors in a few cases; 156 however, these cases
are considered anomalies. 57 Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has
recently indicated its willingness to change its conventional analysis.
In Goldfarb, the Court noted that certain practices of the legal profession might survive scrutiny under the antitrust laws even though they
would be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context. 158 More importantly, the Court stated in Boulder that "certain
activities, which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local
159
government."
However, any modification of the substantive analysis should ad153. 435 U.S. at 408.
154. Ambulance service provides an example where intervention into the market place by a
local government may be needed. Private companies tend to neglect emergency ambulance service in favor of the more profitable nonemergency ambulance service. Emergency service is less
profitable because of the high fixed costs associated with maintaining such a service. Emergency
service requires expensive advanced life support equipment as well as a fleet large enough to meet
peak demand within an adequate response time, though the full capacity is seldom used. Furthermore, the fee collection rate for emergency service is substantially lower than for nonemergency
service. Thus, in an unregulated market, companies have a strong incentive to concentrate on
providing nonemergency, rather than costly emergency service. See Gold Cross Ambulance &
Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1008-09 (8th Cir. 1983).
155. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643 (1981).
156. In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the Court upheld a Board
of Trade rule which restricted competitive bidding on certain commodities after the board closed.
The Court listed various noneconomic factors which it considered in making its decision. Id. at
240-41.
In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), the Court upheld an exclusive sales agency contract among 137 coal producers in Appalachia, under which a central agency
was to sell all the producers' coal at a fixed price.
157. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 108, § 8.2. In Appalachian Coals, the Court was no doubt
heavily influenced by the severe economic crisis that the country was then undergoing.
158. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
159. 455 U.S. at 56 n.20, quoting, City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. at 417 n.48.
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here to the general structure underlying the Act itself as stated by the
Supreme Court in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.:
The Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found
to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definition which might either work injury to legitimate enterprises or through particularization defeat its purposes by providing
oopholes for escape. The restrictions the Act imposes are not
mechanical or artificial. Its general phrases, interpreted to attain its
fundamental objects,
set up the essential standard of
60
reasonableness. 1
Therefore, any modification must be broad enough so as to permit the
Court its continued wide latitude in interpreting the scope and meaning
of the Sherman Act. Additionally, a special rule for municipal defendants must not, in practical effect, emasculate the power of the Sherman
Act so as to render it useless in checking anticompetitive conduct of a
municipality.
1. PROPOSED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. Drawing on the above
guidelines, this article proposes that an affirmative defense be created
for municipal defendants. The proposed affirmative defense would
permit a municipality to defend its challenged conduct on non-economic grounds. This proposal would not alter the substantive analysis
with respect to the prima facie elements of section 1 of the Act. Rather,
the burden would be on the municipality to justify its anticompetitive
conduct. Otherwise, it would be inequitable to require a plaintiff to
prove that a restraint was not only unreasonable, but also not justified
on non-economic grounds.
The proposed affirmative defense would consist of the following
two-part analysis:
Part I: Does the challenged municipal activity restrain an area suitable for competition. If not, the affirmative defense is sustained and
the court would terminate its analysis.
Part II: If the answer to Part I was yes, the court would then weigh
the benefits claimed from the restraint versus the restraint's effect on
competition.
2. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. The
purpose of Part I is to permit the court to identify certain activities that
clearly could not exist in a competitive unregulated environment. For
example, road construction and maintenance are activities that municipal governments frequently finance and regulate. Without the community as a whole bearing the cost of such activities, private construction
160. 428 U.S. 579, 600 n.40 (1976), quoting, Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359-60.
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companies would have to charge commuters and travelers user fees in
order for it to recoup its investment and make a profit. User fees could
make daily travel nearly impossible for certain economic groups.
The Sherman Act, of course, is aimed at promoting competition.
However, if promoting competition is impossible in a particular area of
the local economy, then the Sherman Act proscription may be counterproductive. Therefore, as the case above illustrates, it seems reasonable
to permit a municipality's challenged conduct to continue in that particular area. Notwithstanding, it must be emphasized that very few
areas of economic control or regulation are not suitable for competition. This initial inquiry is only to identify those few areas. And in
those areas, anticompetitive conduct on the part of a municipality will
be permitted without further justification.
Part II is resorted to if the challenged conduct does restrain an
area suitable for competition. If the restraint's effect on competition
was deemed less injurious than beneficial to the community, the restraint would be upheld. However, a restraint that is found to have no
benefits to the comunity would immediately be held unreasonable,
thereby foreclosing the need to balance. The court's inquiry into a restraint's claimed benefits should look beyond any alleged motive for or
purpose of the restraint and consider only the actual or probable benefits to be derived by the community from the restraint.
Part II presents the greatest deviation from conventional Sherman
Act analysis by permitting anticompetitive conduct to stand because of
noncompetitive factors. The purpose of Part II is to permit municipalities some leeway to restrain trade for the benefit of their community
without always violating the Sherman Act.
The dissent in Boulder criticized any attempt to permit municipal
defendants to defend their anticompetitive conduct on the basis of the
conduct's benefits, reasoning that it would open a "Pandora's Box."' 6 1
This "Pandora's Box," the dissent claimed, would allow the federal
courts to engage in a wide ranging standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulations which they claim has long been rejected
by the Court. 162 The dissenters concluded that the Boulder decision
would effectively paralyze local governments from enacting ordinances
and regulations aimed at protecting public health, safety, and welfare,
for fear of subjecting local government to liability under the Sherman
161. 455 U.S. at 67.
162. Id. at 67-68.
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Act. 163
The dissent's criticism of permitting the courts to weigh municipal
anticompetitive conduct against its benefits is unfounded. The
Supreme Court has long recognized the usefulness of balancing tests
when state or local ordinances conflict with federal interests. For instance, local versus national interests are balanced in dormant commerce clause cases.164 In dormant commerce clause cases, the state has
regulated an area of commerce not yet preempted by Congress.165 The
balancing test necessarily required the Court to inquire into the nature
of the ordinance, its effect on interstate commerce, and its marginal
benefits to the local community.166 This area of law is currently in a
state of flux, but at no time has the Court expressed dissatisfaction in
regard to inquiring into local legislation. 167 Therefore, the proposed
affirmative defense does not put the Court into an uncharted area.
The scheme as outlined above adheres to the general tenets of the
Sherman Act as being "general" and "adaptable" but not "detailed"
nor "particularized."' 16 It permits the Court the wide latitude of analy163. Id.
164. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 83, ch. 5. In dormant commerce clause cases,
Congress has been silent regarding the area of commerce regulated by a state statute. The statute
is challenged on the basis that it impinges on interstate commerce. In analyzing the statute, the
Court takes "it upon itself to implement the values of the grant of power to Congress in the
Commerce Clause by restricting state impingements on interstate commerce." Id. at 256-57.
Thus, a state statute will be preempted by the commerce clause if it is found to burden interstate
commerce.
165. Id.
166. The Court first developed the balancing test for dormant commerce clause cases in
Southern Pac. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), where the Court balanced the state's safety benefits
derived from state's regulation of train car lengths versus the regulation's detrimental effect on the
free flow of interstate commerce. See also Raymond Motor Tranps., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978) (state law which banned trucks longer than 55 feet held unconstitutional); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (state law requiring rear mudflaps on trucks held unconstitutional). The lower courts have also used balancing tests for suits against cities under Title VIII
(Fair Housing) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601. See, e.g., United States v. City
of Blackjack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (once plaintiff has established a primafacie case
by demonstrating racially discriminatory effect of the city's conduct, the burden shifts to the government defendant to demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest); Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (permits
city to show valid nondiscriminatory reasons for challenged actions); cf. Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (court did not adopt Blackjack's "compelling interest" justification, but would permit municipal defendants to show that no alternative course of action could be
adopted that would enable the municipal interest to be served in a less discriminatory impact).
167. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981), the Supreme Court in a
plurality decision held that if the state's safety benefits were nonillusory (if there was a significant
safety benefit), no balancing would be necessary. The plurality would require balancing only if
the safety benefits from the state regulation were marginal. The dissent would uphold state regulation if there was a rational basis to assert its safety benefits.
168. The Court has stated that these are the underlying tenets of the Sherman Act. See supra
note 160.
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sis permitted under the conventional Sherman Act analysis and yet allows for the additional inquiry concerning noncompetitive benefits of a
given restraint. Moreover, although the proposed affirmative defense
factors are non-economic factors, its principal focus is on competition.
Three important benefits will be derived from the proposed affirmative defense which can be summarized as follows:
1. The affirmative defense is broad enough to give the courts the
discretion needed to fully implement the policies of the Sherman
Act.
2. Municipalities and their officials are given some standard by
which to measure their conduct.
3. The members of the local community will derive the benefits of:
a. Having local governments abandon ill conceived local restraints for the beneficial influences of competition; and
b. The maintenance of local restraints that yield the greatest
marginal benefits to the community.
D. Per Se Analysis
The courts have held that certain types of restraints are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. 169 The court, in so holding, can
avoid any elaborate inquiry as to the harm caused by the restraint or
economic investigation of the industry involved, in an effort to determine whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable. 170 There
are very few restraints that fall within the per se rule, however, because
the courts are reluctant to so hold without the benefit of considerable
17 1
experience in evaluating the restraint's competitive impact.
Theper se analysis should not initially be used in municipal antitrust cases. The courts have not developed any experience or expertise
with municipal restraints of trade or their effects on competition, unlike
the courts' long experience with private restraint. Therefore, the courts
currently are not equipped with sufficient knowledge to consider a municipal restraint a per se violation. Additionally, the per se analysis
would be inconsistent with the proposed affirmative defense or any
type of balancing test the court may fashion. Implicit in the balancing
test is that any given restraint may have beneficial effects that override
its detrimental effect on competition. The per se analysis would prohibit any balancing leaving municipalities unable to defend their
regulations.
169. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. i, 5 (1958).
170. Id. at 5.
171. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 108, § 8.3.
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IV.

ASSESSMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGES AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES

Lafayette and Boulder have raised the specter of treble damages
being assessed against a municipality that violates the antitrust laws.
Since Lafayette, commentators 7 2 as well as several Supreme Court
Justices have concluded that treble damages should not be assessed
against a municipality that violates the antitrust laws. 73 The Boulder
decision did not clarify whether treble damages could be applied
against municipalities because the issue was not before the Court.
However, the dissenters in Boulder noted that:
It [would] take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics to conclude
that municipalities are not subject to treble damages to compensate
any person "injured in his business or property." Section 4 of the
Clayton Act * * * is mandatory, any person who shall be injured in

his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
him. 174

* * *

shall recover threefold the damages sustained by

In fact, a federal jury has recently awarded a plaintiff damages in an
antitrust case against a county, a village, and village officials. 7 5 Nonetheless, the treble damage issue is still an open question as the plurality
in Lafayette noted that "remedies appropriate to redress violations by
private corporations" may not be "especially appropriate for
'7 6
municipalities."'
This section will discuss the likelihood that the Supreme Court
will permit treble damages to be assessed against a municipal defend172. A Justice Department attorney feels that "threats of criminal and treble damage liability
may not be the best way of inducing optimum decision-making" by municipal representatives.
Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General-Antitrust Division, Remarks at Florida
ALI-ABA Course of Study (Oct. 21, 1982). See also Areeda, supra note 3, at 454-56; Hoskins,
"The Boulder Revolution" in MunicipalAntitrust Law, 70 ILL. B.J. 684, 685-86 (1982).
173. Justice Stewart, in his dissent in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, noted that
treble damages would seriously disrupt the operation of every state regulated utility company in
the U.S. Id. at 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Lafayette, stated
that it would be a grave act to assess treble damages against governmental units. 435 U.S. at 442
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174. 455 U.S. at 65 n.2.
175. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1984-1 Trade Cas.)
65,883 (N.D. Ill. 1984). In Unity Ventures, a district court jury sustained the plaintiff's contention
that a county municipality and county and municipal officials unlawfully blocked his plans to
develop a tract of land within the municipality. The jury awarded the plaintiff $9.5 million which
was automatically trebled to $28.5 million. Id. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700
F.2d 226 (5th Cir.), reh'ggranteden bane, 714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983), is the only other case to find
a municipality to have violated the antitrust laws. Affiliated Capital involved a conspiracy by the
City of Houston and private parties (cable TV applicants) to engage in an unlawful territorial
market division of cable TV franchises awarded by the city. However, on appeal the City of
Houston was dismissed as a defendant, Id. at 237 n.15, and as a consequence no damages were
awarded against it.
176. 435 U.S. at 402. The plurality did not articulate on what basis or in what situations a
municipality may not be liable for treble damages.
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ant. As illustrative of the Court's attitude toward and rationale for assessing damages against municipalities, this section will examine the
development of municipal liability under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.177 Section 1983 cases provide an excellent example
of the Court's permitting significant damages to be awarded against
municipalities, while disregarding the pleas of "financial ruin" that
might befall cities by allowing damage recovery. Historical development of municipalities' liability under section 1983 will be discussed
with the Court's rationale for permitting damages to be assessed
against municipalities and denying them immunity from damages.
Next, an examination of the legislative history of the treble damages
section of the antitrust laws will be discussed with the underlying purposes of the section and the Court's self-imposed limitations from formulating new remedies. Together, these two areas may help discern
overall case trends and Court attitude toward assessing damages
against municipalities which violate federal statutes and thus may determine the likely course the Court will take in respect to assessing
treble damages against municipalities.
A.

Municipalities' Civil Rights Liability Under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983

The Lafayette Court did not consider it anomalous to subject municipalities to criminal and civil liabilities imposed upon violators of
the antitrust laws.' 7 8 The Court concluded this by noting that compliance by municipalities with substantive standards of other federal
laws 179 which impose monetary sanctions upon persons has long been
recognized.18 0 Section 1983 imposes liability upon every person who,
under color of state law or custom, "subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."'u 8
Therefore, since section 1983, which imposes liability on "persons," is
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
178. 435 U.S. at 400.
179. Id. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (the Court held that
municipalities were subject to § I of the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847, as amended 34 Stat. 587, 49
U.S.C. § 41 (1)); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (the Court sustained federal tax liability
imposed upon the State of Ohio in its business as a distributor); California v. United States, 320
U.S. 577 (1944) (the Court held that a city and state are subject to §§ 16 and 17 of the Shipping
Act, 39 Stat. 734 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 815-16).
180. 435 U.S. at 400. Municipalities were first held to be "persons" within the meaning of the
Sherman Act in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
However, in Chattanooga the municipality was a plaintiff; it was not until Lafayette that municipal defendants were considered "persons" under the Sherman Act. 435 U.S. at 392-93.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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remedial 8 2 in nature like the antitrust laws, and permits recovery of
large damage awards against municipalities,1 83 it would be instructive
84
to discuss the evolution of municipalities' section 1983 liability.'
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. The initial historical development of municipalities' section 1983 liability parallels that of the Sherman Act. The first question before the Court was whether
municipalities were "persons" for section 1983 purposes. In Monroe v.
s 5 the Court held that local governments were not "persons" for
Pape,18
section 1983 purposes and hence were wholly immune from suit under
section 1983. The Court, after analyzing the legislative history of section 1983, concluded that Congress doubted its constitutional power to
impose civil liability on municipalities and that such doubt would have
extended to any type of civil liability. 18 6 Justice Douglas, the author of
Monroe, suggested that the municipal exclusion rested on the theory
that Congress sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose on municipalities. 87 The Court, in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 188 disregarded Justice Douglas' suggestion
and expressly overruled Monore, holding that municipalities were
"persons" for purposes of section 1983.189 The Court, at this point, declined to express the full contours of municipalities' potential liability
under section 1983.
Thus, municipalities after Monell were faced with the possibility of
enormous civil rights liability exposure, similar to the situation now
facing municipalities after Boulder and Lafayette, of significant antitrust liability exposure. The dissent in Monell expressed strong concern
about cities' potential liability. The dissent stated that it never occurred to members of Congress that the Civil Rights Act did impose or
could have imposed any liability upon municipal corporations. 90 The
dissent further noted that none of the members of the Congress could
foresee the practical consequences of their decision of removing munic182. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 686 (1978).
183. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
184. A district court, in discussing the appropriateness of treble damages being assessed
against a public entity, noted approvingly municipal liability under § 1983. Grayson Elec. Co. v.
Sacramento Mun. Util., 526 F. Supp. 276, 281 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
185. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
186. Id. at 190.
187. 436 U.S. at 665 n.9.
188. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
189. After a lengthy analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1871's history, Id. at 685-701, the Court
found nothing in the Act's legislative history to conclude that municipalities were to be exempt
from its reach. Id. at 701.
190. 436 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ipalities' immunity and, hence, exposing municipalities' limited treasuries to their officials' failure to predict the course of constitutional
jurisprudence.' t9 The dissent hoped that Congress would modify the
192
law to protect municipalities from civil rights liability.
Congress and the Court disregarded the dissent's dire warnings.
The Court in Owen v. City of Independence 193 had an oportunity to
limit municipalities' exposure to liability by permitting a qualified good
faith immunity 194 to local governments for violations of section 1983.
Nonetheless, the Court denied municipalities a qualified immunity.
The Court, later in that term, further broadened the scope of section
1983 suits by permitting plaintiffs to bring section 1983 suits for violations of federal statutes as well as the Constitution. 95 The Court also
196
upheld the application of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act
to the statutory section of 1983 claims. 197 The following year, however,
the Court gave municipalities some relief from civil rights liability by
denying the recovery of punitive damages against a municipal
98
defendant.
2. RATIONALE FOR PERMITTING MUNICIPAL SECTION
1983 LIABILITY AND ITS EFFECT ON MUNICIPALITIES. Section 1983 and the antitrust laws both envision private parties recovering damages against one who violates these statutes. Owen makes it
clear that municipalities should be liable in damages for violating section 1983. The underlying rationale for permitting section 1983 damages to be assessed against municipalities as well as denying them
immunity will be discussed below. Additionally, how the Court has
dealt with the impact of civil rights liability on public treasuries will be
examined.
The Monell and Owen Courts considered the historical treatment
191. Id. at 724.
192. Id.
193. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
194. Many lower courts had held that a qualified good faith immunity did protect municipalities from § 1983 liability. See generally S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 6.08 (1979 & Supp. 1983); Weeks, Personal Liability Under Federal Law- Major
Developments Since Monell, 12 URB. LAw. 264, 265-66 (1980).
195. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act permits prevailing parties
in § 1983 cases to collect reasonable attorney's fees as part of their costs.
197. 448 U.S. at 11.
198. Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). The Newport Court reasoned that
punitive damages were unavailable as against municipal defendants because Congress did not
intend to disturb the settled common law that recognized municipal immunity from punitive damages. Id. at 265. Therefore, the Court reasoned that if Congress intended to permit punitive
damage awards against municipalities, it would have explicitly made such a provision. 1d.
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of municipalities' tort liability as indicative of political subdivisions'
amenability to suit and paying out damages to an injured party. The
Owen Court articulated the following additional policy reasons why
municipalities should be assessed damages under section 1983:
1) Without a meaningful remedy, aggrieved individuals will have little
incentive to seek vindication of their rights. 199 2) Damage awards serve
as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations of individuals
by municipalities. 2°° 3) The threat of damages being levied against the
city "may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of uncon'20
stitutional infringements on constitutional rights."
The Court also concluded that the doctrine of official immunity is
inapplicable in section 1983 actions. The Owen Court identified two
rationales on which the doctrine of official immunity rested: 1) "[T]he
injustice, in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer
who is required by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion, '20 2 and 2) "[Tlhe danger that the threat of such liability would
deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the
judgment required by his office. ' 20 3 The Court stated that the first consideration is not implicated when the damages award comes from the
public treasury and not the official's pocket. 2°4 Therefore, the Court
noted that the second consideration is significantly reduced, if not eliminated, when the threat to personal liability is removed. The Court
thought it questionable that the possibility of municipal monetary loss
20 5
would deter a public official from the diligent exercise of his duties.
Furthermore, the Court stated that "public decision-makers should always consider the constitutional impact of their acts and policies and
'20 6
would otherwise be derelict in their duties if they did not.
As was noted earlier, Justices and commentators have expressed
concern about the potentially devastating effects of exposing municipalities to section 1983 and antitrust liability. In 1981, New York City
alone had civil rights claims pending against it of over $250,000,000.207
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
L. REV
207.
PERSPS.

445 U.S. at 651 n.33.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 654, quoting, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
445 U.S. at 654.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id. See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
1133, 1224 (1977).
Colello, The Mandate, the Mayor, and the Menace of Liability, 7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL
15 (1980). This article contains preliminary data from a survey undertaken by the Na-
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The Owen Court addressed the issue of revenue raised by taxation being diverted to the benefit of a single or discrete group of taxpayers.
The Court stated that it is only fair that a city should be liable to make
good the damage sustained by an individual in consequence of the
city's conduct. 20 8 Further, the Court stated that it is perfectly proper to
use the taxpayers' money because it is the public who enjoys the benefit
of government and therefore it is the public who is responsible for its
administration. 209 Therefore, the Court concluded that it is "fairer to
allocate any resulting loss to the inevitable cost of government borne by
all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt by those whose
'210
rights have been violated.
B.

Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws

The importance of the treble damages remedy provided by the antitrust laws cannot be overstated. The legislative history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts together with case law suggests that treble
damages are an indispensable part of the antitrust laws for several reasons. This section will explore those reasons as well as the self-imposed
court limitations on fashioning new remedies.
1. TREBLE DAMAGES' LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE. The legislative debates concerning the Sherman Act do not
mention the possibility of municipalities being held liable for treble
damages. Nonetheless, the debates highlight the importance Congress
attached to the remedies section of the Sherman Act.
Initial antitrust bills introduced into the House of Representatives
did not incorporate a civil remedies section but contained only criminal
provisions. 211 An antitrust bill containing a civil remedy was first introduced into the Senate by Senator John Sherman (R-Ohio) and authorized recovery of double damages. 21 2 An amended version of the
bill was later debated in the Senate. Sherman, in responding to criticism of the bill, emphasized that citizens should have the right to a
tional Institute of Municipal Law Officers on the impact of § 1983 liability on local governments.
Among other information, the survey lists dollar amounts of civil rights claims pending against
selected metropolitan areas in 198 1. For example, Jackson, Wyo., population 2,101, had pending
claims against it of $2,800,000, while Chicago had pending claims against it of over $775,000,000.
The total civil rights claims pending against 169 municipalities, surveyed in 1981, amounted to
over $4 billion. Id. at 18, 19.
208. 445 U.S. at 654, quoting, Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. 511, 515 (1837).

209. Id. at 655.
210. Id.
211. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 108, § 4.3.
212. Id. §§ 4.3, 4.4.
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remedy and to sue for and recover damages for antitrust injuries that
2 13
they have suffered.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, perhaps acting upon Senator
Sherman's concern for an adequate remedy, amended the remedies section (section 7) of the bill to provide for treble damages. 2 14 This version eventually passed the Senate and without debate passed the House
of Representatives. The bill, known as the Sherman Antitrust Act, 21 5

was signed into law on July 2,

1890.216

Section 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act was later repealed and incorporated in whole in section 4 of the Clayton Act. 2 17 The House
debates on section 4 of Clayton considered the section as "opening the
door of justice to everyman, whenever he may be injured by those who
violate the antitrust laws, and giving the injured party ample damages
for the wrong suffered. '2 18 Additionally, treble damage suits were considered a principal method for enforcing the antitrust laws.
The purpose of the treble damage section of the Clayton Act
closely mirrors those underlying section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
As in section 1983, the private antitrust action was created primarily as
a remedy for injured parties. 2 19 Treble damages serve to make whole
those who have been injured by the conduct of a violator 220 and counterbalance the difficulty of maintaining a private action. 221 Additionally, treble damages strongly deter future antitrust violators as well as
punish past violators. 22 2 Furthermore, treble damages encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws. This private enforcement helps
to vindicate the important public interest in free competition 223 and
also to encourage individuals to serve as "private attorney generals" to
enforce the antitrust laws. 224 Finally, these private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Depart213. Id. § 4.8. Sen. Turpie (R.-Ind.) echoed Sen. Sherman's attitude, by stating that one of the
chief purposes of the antitrust bill was to provide parties.injured a civil .remedy for injury reflected. Id.
214. Id. § 4.12.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
216. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 108, § 4.17.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
218. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977), quoting, 51
CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb).
219, American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982).
220. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 583 F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1976).
221. 429 U.S. at 486 n.10, quoting, 21 CONG. REc. 246 (1908) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
222. 456 U.S. at 576-7.
223. Fortner v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
224. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968).
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ment of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws. 2 25
2. LIMITATION ON THE COURTS FROM FORMULATING
NEW REMEDIES OR ALTERING EXISTING ONES. In every
case involving the construction of a statute, the starting point of the
analysis must be the language employed by Congress. 226 On its face,
section 4 of the Clayton Act contains little in the way of restrictive language. 2 27 From this it is evident that Congress did not intend to give
courts wide discretion in formulating remedies to enforce provisions of
the Sherman Act. Congress' intent to allow the courts to develop governing principles with regard to substantive violations does not appear
in debates on the treble damage action created in section 7 of the original Act. 228 The description of the power of federal courts under the
Antitrust Acts suggests a sharp distinction between the courts' power to
define antitrust violations and its ability to fashion relief available to
229
the parties.
The Supreme Court, on several instances, has shown its reluctance
to limit the remedial scheme of the antitrust laws. For example, the
Court has denied the common law defense ofparidelicIo230 for an antitrust violation 2 3' and the right to contribution among joint antitrust violations. 232 The Court has often indicated the inappropriateness of
225. 456 U.S. at 572 n.10.
226. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
227. Id.
228. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1981).
229. Id. at 644. The remedies section of the antitrust laws are very detailed in structure as
opposed to the broad language of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act. For example, violations of §§ I
or 2 are crimes; private parties can recover treble damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees,
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15; the United States can enjoin violations, Sherman Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 4; the United States can recover single damages for injury to its "business or property,"
Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a; parenspatre suits can be brought by state's attorney general,
Clayton Act §§ 4c-4h, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h; a final judgment of an antitrust violation in one
action will serve as prima facie evidence in any subsequent action or proceeding, Clayton Act
§ 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a); additionally, the remedial provisions of the antimerger laws are also
quite detailed, Clayton Act §§ 7-11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18-21.
230. Paridelictomeans "in equal fault." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (5th ed. 1979). This
defense is employed by the defendant when he alleges that the plaintiff, who is seeking damages or
equitable relief, is himself involved in the same wrongdoing.
231. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). In Perma
Life, the Court noted that there is nothing in the language of the antitrust laws indicating congressional intent that the doctrine ofpari delicto should constitute a defense to a private antitrust
action. Moreover, the Court stated that the application of the doctrine would undermine the
important function performed by the private antitrust action in enforcing the antitrust laws. Id. at
138-40.
232. 451 U.S. 630. Contribution, a common law rule, is invoked when several tortfeasors have
caused injury but damages have been assessed against only one of the tortfeasors. This sole
tortfeasor, pursuant to the contribution doctrine, will demand that each tortfeasor pay his pro rata
share of the damages. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 50.
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invoking broad common law barriers to relief where a private suit
serves an important public purpose.2 33 Moreover, the Court has
broadly read section 4 of the Clayton Act so as to permit a foreign
nation 234 to bring an antitrust suit and to reject arguments that the section 4 remedy is only available to redress injury to commercial
235
interests.
Municipalities are also not likely to escape liability by arguing that
because their primary goals are not private profit but chiefly public
service it would be inappropriate to levy treble damages against them.
The Court disregarded similar arguments in an analogous setting. In
American Society of MechanicalEngineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corporation,236 the Court refused to immunize from treble damages a nonprofit, tax-exempt trade association which promulgated codes and
standards for various areas of engineering and industry. The majority
disregarded the dissent's view that levying treble damages against such
organizations was wholly inappropriate and stated that regardless of
the organization's status, if it violates the antitrust laws, it is only fitting
237
that it should be liable for damages arising from such a violation.
C. Analysis of Section 1983 Case Law andAntitrust Policiesof
Assessing Damages on Municipalities
The section 1983 cases highlight the fact that the Court will assess
233. 392 U.S. at 138. The Court's overriding concern of not discouraging private antitrust suit
is also shown by its disinterest of any alleged wrongdoing of the plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff
was not barred recovery, even by proof that it had engaged in an unrelated antitrust violation.
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). In another case, a dealer
who had signed an agreement with defendant to adhere to fixed resale price could bring an antitrust suit even though he was partially involved in the illegal activity. Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
377 U.S. 13 (1964).
234. Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978).
235. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979). In Reiter, the Court held that a
consumer has standing to seek a § 4 remedy reflecting the increase in the purchase price of goods
attributable to a price fixing conspiracy. Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of limitations on the availability of a § 4 remedy which courts must consider when examining whether a treble damages action is maintainable.
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) the Court held that § 4 did not authorize a
state to sue in itsparenspatriaecapacity for damages to its "general economy." In Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Court held that indirect purchasers in a chain of distribution were precluded from bringing a damage action based on overcharge passed on to them by the
direct purchasers of an antitrust violator. The Court based these decisions on two policy considerations: 1) the risk of duplicate recovery by every person in the distribution chain, and 2) to avoid
burdening § 4 actions with damage issues giving rise to the need for massive evidence and complicated theories, where the consequence would be to discourage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws by private suits. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.lI (1982).
In a municipal antitrust context neither of the above two policy considerations are implicated.
236. 456 U.S. 556.
237. Id. at 577.
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damages against municipalities irrespective of its potentially damaging
effects on the operations of local government. The fear of public treasuries being depleted due to a large antitrust judgment against a municipality, while a reasonable concern, will probably not persuade the
Court to immunize cities against treble damages. The Owen Court
clearly took this view in regard to municipalities' section 1983 liability
by espousing the doctrine of equitable spending (i.e., injury to a party
at the hands of government should be compensated and the cost borne
by each member of the community). By reason of the section 1983
cases it would seem unlikely that the Court will take a more benevolent
attitude toward municipalities by immunizing them from treble damage liability.
The policy rationales underlying section 1983 damages are clearly
implicated in the antitrust context. Without treble damages available
to private parties the remedial, deterrent, and private enforcement attributes of treble damages would be greatly diminished if not eliminated. The section 1983 cases noted that these rationales were
sufficient to impose section 1983 liability on municipalities.
The section 1983 cases also pointed out the beneficial effects of
municipalities' section 1983 liability on their decision-makers by creating an incentive for them to scrutinize more carefully the policies they
238
implement so as to comply with constitutional rights and guarantees.
Similarly, public officials would be forced to examine local regulations
of the economy to assure comportment with the antitrust laws, if municipalities faced treble damages. However, if municipalities were immune from treble damages, their local decision-makers would probably
be less deterred from promulgating anticompetitive policies for two
reasons. First, municipalities would face only the threat of injunctive
relief and other equitable remedies. Clearly, such remedies are much
less onerous than treble damages, thus making decision-makers less
concerned with contemplating antitrust laws while promulgating and
implementing policies. Secondly, private enforcement of the antitrust
laws as against municipalities would be greatly diminished. A potential plaintiff will likely view equitable relief as an inadequate remedy,
especially in view of the enormous costs associated with antitrust litigation and thus refrain from bringing private suits. This fact takes on
special importance in view of the unlikelihood of the Department of
Justice bringing antitrust suits against municipalities. Thus, with no
governmental enforcement and little or no private enforcement of the
238. 445 U.S. at 656.
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antitrust laws as against municipalities, municipal officals could implement policies with little concern for the antitrust laws.
Notwithstanding the above, perhaps the most compelling reason
the courts will permit treble damages to be assessed against municipalities is that "there is nothing in the statute itself, in its legislative history,
or in the overall regulatory scheme to suggest that Congress intended
courts to have the power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted. '239 If public policy deems it inappropriate to hold municipalities
liable for treble damages, such change must come from Congress and
240
not from the courts.
239. 451 U.S. at 645.
240. The Court made this explicit concerning antitrust defendants' right to contribution, stating it is up to Congress to enact legislation to permit such right. 451 U.S. at 646. When Congress
wished to exempt municipal service operations from the coverage of the antitrust laws, it.has done
so without ambiguity. The Act of May 26, 1938, ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976 ed.),
grants a limited exemption to certain not-for-profit institutions for "purchases of their supplies for
their own use" from the provisions of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976 ed.), which otherwise make it unlawful for a supplier
to grant, or for an institution to induce, a discriminatory discount with respect to such supplies.
Congress expressly included public libraries in this exemption. (Public libraries are, by definition,
operated by local government.) See I U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, BIENNIAL SURVEYS OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

27 (Library Service 1938-40) (1947); 2 U.S.

OFFICE OF EDUCA-

38 (Statistical Summary of Education, 1941-42) at 38; 32 AM. LIBR. A. BULL. 272 (1938).
Federal and state governmental responses to the threat of municipal antitrust damages have
been varied. The state action doctrine was reviewed by a congressional commission in 1979 which
concluded that the narrowing of the doctrine is "appropriate and desirable, and [the narrowing]
contributed greatly to the general movement toward greater scrutiny of the regulatory decisionmaking .... " The commission believes that the "general direction of the development of the
case law is. . .clearly correct." National Commissionfor the Review ofAntitrust Laws and Procedures, Report to the President and the Attorney General 183 (Jan. 22, 1979).
However, after the Boulder decision Sen. Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) introduced a bill in the
Senate that granted municipalities partial immunity from the antitrust laws. The text of the Thurmond bill follows:
S. 1578. A bill to clarify the application of the Federal antitrust laws to local governments.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1983".
Sec. 2. The Federal antitrust laws shall not apply to any law or other action of, or
official action directed by, a city, village, town, township, county, or other general function unit of local government in the exercise of its regulatory powers, including but not
limited to zoning, franchising, licensing, and the establishment of monopoly public services, but excluding any activity involving the sale of goods or services by the unit of local
government in competition with private persons, where such law or action is valid under
state law, except to the extent that the Federal antitrust laws would apply to a similar law
or action of, or official action directed by, a State. For purposes of this section, the term
"Federal antitrust laws" means the antitrust laws, as such term is defined in the first
section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. [§]12), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. [§]45).
Thurmond Introduces Bill to Extend Parkerto Local Government Regulation, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1122, at 22-23 (July 7, 1983). In response to Sen. Thurmond's proposed bill, William Baxter, then chief of the antitrust division of the Justice
Department, stated that the proposed bill was unnecessary because Boulder "really did not change
TION
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the law in any significant way." Thurmond Plans to Offer Bill Dealing with Boulder, [Jan.-June]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1103, at 384 (Feb. 24, 1983).
Maryland has become the first state to attempt to protect its local governmental units from
potential antitrust liability. The Maryland legislature has enacted legislation designed to "confirm
existing powers of local governments to displace or limit competition" in specified areas. (S.B.
629, S.B. 635, S.B. 770). Maryland Becomes First State to Address Boulder Standards, [July-Dec.]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1122, at 23 (July 7, 1983).
One area is waste disposal and the resultant bill states: "Ithas been and shall continue to be
the policy of the state that [each local governmental unit] is directed and authorized to exercise all
powers regarding waste collection and disposal notwithstanding any anticompetitive effect." Id.
Whether the Maryland statutes, or statutes similar to them, constitute sufficient state authorization
so as to bring municipal anticompetitive conduct under the state action doctrine remains to be
tested.

